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ABSTRACT: In recent years, health system stakeholders have experimented with a wide range 
of efforts to stimulate quality improvement, often combined with efforts to contain costs. In this 
report, the authors explore strategies that public and private purchasers are using to improve care 
quality, focusing specifically on the role that states play as employers providing health benefits 
for public employees and retirees. Examples of innovations used by state public employee health 
plans include: promoting provider adherence to clinical guidelines and best practices, publicly 
disseminating provider performance information, implementing performance-based incentives, 
developing coordinated care interventions, and taking part in multi-payer quality collaborations. 
This report can be used by public employee health plans and other large purchasers making 
strategic decisions about how to develop or coordinate quality improvement initiatives. 
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 WHAT PUBLIC EMPLOYEE HEALTH PLANS 
CAN DO TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE QUALITY: 
EXAMPLES FROM THE STATES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Quality Improvement in Health Care 
Health care leaders, policymakers, and researchers have long recognized important 
deficiencies in the quality of care in the U.S. health care system.1 Limits to care quality 
can be observed by examining gaps between recommended care processes and outcomes 
and the actual performance of the health care system.2 Recent reports demonstrate how 
the quality of care varies from state to state; health care systems in leading states, on 
average, perform better than those in lagging states on multiple quality-related 
indicators.3 Moreover, researchers have long identified health care disparities that 
compromise the quality of care for certain populations based on environmental, social, 
economic, cultural, and other factors.4
 
In recent years, large health care purchasers, including large employers, public 
programs, and other health system stakeholders, have experimented with a wide range of 
efforts to stimulate quality improvements, often combined with efforts to contain costs.5 
Many large employers, for example, have developed quality initiatives independently, 
through employer coalitions, and through other multi-payer initiatives.6 Public purchasers, 
including Medicare and Medicaid, are increasingly adopting new quality-oriented 
measures, public reporting of provider performance, payment reforms, and other strategies. 
 
Options available to improve care quality vary by the kind of indicators used, the 
types of incentives employed, and the specific populations targeted. Purchasers have 
experimented with varying forms of payment reform and other incentives to motivate 
quality improvement among hospitals, physicians, and other providers. Additionally, they 
use other strategies to influence individuals to make informed health care choices and to 
manage care more effectively. Many quality improvement strategies combine elements of 
these supply-side (i.e., provider) and demand-side (i.e., consumer) approaches, 
recognizing that deficiencies in care quality are the result of complex interactions of 
factors that require multifaceted responses. 
 
State Employee Health Plans and Health Care Quality 
Studies and reports have focused on states’ efforts to improve care quality through public 
programs, such as Medicaid.7 This paper focuses on the quality improvement options 
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 available to states in their role as health care purchasers in public employee health 
plans (PEHPs). 
 
PEHPs are large employer-based health plans providing health care benefits for 
about 13 million people across the United States.8 Those receiving health benefits through 
PEHPs include active state employees, covered dependents, retirees in state governments, 
employees in some local governments, and employees and dependents of other quasi-
public entities, such as public universities and K–12 school systems. PEHPs are financed 
through general state and county revenues and premium contributions from participating 
public sector employers, employees, and their dependents. As large employers (or 
specifically, as health care purchasing entities serving public employers), PEHPs are 
responsible for an increasingly large share of state health care spending, second only to 
state Medicaid programs. In fiscal year 2003, the most recent year for which 50-state 
comparative data are available, state spending on public employee and retiree health 
benefits accounted for about 16 percent of total state health spending (excluding the 
federal share), on average, up from 10 percent in fiscal year 1997. 9,10
 
State PEHPs can contribute to quality improvement and affordability initiatives at 
the state level, including initiatives directly affecting traditional PEHP constituencies, as 
well as initiatives that benefit other populations.11 Given that state governments are 
typically the largest employer group in any given state, state PEHPs are responsible for a 
large volume of health care purchasing. This can yield considerable influence in 
negotiations with participating health plans and provider groups, in terms of encouraging 
their participation in quality improvement, cost containment, and related initiatives. In 
addition, state PEHPs may be in a position to combine their quality improvement 
activities and strategies with other large public and private sector purchasers, including 
Medicaid, other public programs, and private health plans and employer groups. The 
combined market leverage of such coalitions can enhance PEHPs’ purchasing advantage 
and help to coordinate state-level quality promotion activities. 
 
Geographic distribution plays an important role in PEHPs’ purchasing leverage 
and focus. The vast majority of PEHP health care purchasing activity occurs within 
states’ own borders, although some geographic regions within a state (e.g., the state 
capital or university locations) may have greater concentrations of public employees. In 
contrast, the broad trend of nationalization of private employers has increasingly resulted 
in private sector benefit decisions being made on a centralized basis and a lack of direct 
involvement with or concern for local or state market issues among many large 
employers.12 Furthermore, while private employers may be clustered in one or two 
locations within a state, PEHPs often administer benefits in every health care market 
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 throughout the state. This can provide PEHP leaders with knowledge of and influence in 
local health care markets. 
 
Median job tenure in the public sector is about 80 percent higher than that of 
private employers.13 This means that PEHPs’ targeted investments in health care quality 
initiatives can drive performance improvements over a longer time horizon than most 
large employers whose employees may move away or switch jobs more frequently. 
Because providers and health plans typically contract with multiple purchasers, state 
PEHP investments in quality promotion, directly or through third parties (e.g., health 
plans), may yield important results not only for primary PEHP constituencies but also for 
other individuals not covered by PEHPs. Therefore, quality improvement efforts may 
have a spillover impact on non-PEHP patients. 
 
There are several key issues that may inhibit the ability of PEHPs to contribute to 
quality promotion activities at the state level. These include: 
 
• Size. While PEHPs are typically among the largest employer purchasing groups in 
any given state, even the largest PEHPs only account for a relatively small 
percentage of total health care spending in the state. For example, despite covering 
over 1.3 million lives, the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS) 
accounts for less than 4 percent of total health care purchasing in California. 
• Market variability. State market conditions vary considerably from state to state, 
which can affect the range of options available to any given PEHP. For example, 
a PEHP seeking to stimulate or leverage competition based on performance may 
be limited if there are few health plan options in the state. 
• State regulations. Cumbersome state purchasing rules and procedures may 
challenge innovative purchasing efforts developed by even the most determined 
and visionary PEHP staff, governing boards, and policymakers. 
• Financial issues. Most states are grappling with new public accounting standards 
and difficult state budgetary conditions that prioritize cost containment over 
quality promotion activities. Thus, even large and assertive PEHPs may be 
constrained in their ability to focus on quality improvement efforts unless those 
efforts also address the cost of care and other pressing policy priorities.14 
• Focus on cost containment. In general, public employees typically receive more 
generous benefits compared with their counterparts in the private sector. These 
richer benefits often involve higher costs, which may motivate state PEHPs to link 
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 quality improvement initiatives with cost containment efforts. Focusing on cost 
containment, however, may limit the quality improvement options available. 
• Political environment. State health care purchasing may be subject to the 
political will of state legislatures and the influence of unions, thereby influencing 
the options available to particular PEHPs. 
 
Little is known about the role state PEHPs play in the broader state health policy 
environment. In contrast, researchers have examined other larger public health care 
purchasers to determine the impacts of purchasing behavior and contracting approaches 
on health system development and performance. Such studies emphasize the great 
potential Medicare and other public purchasers have to influence health system 
stakeholders (e.g., managed care organizations, physicians, hospitals, consumers).15
 
This paper explores some of the options available to public and private 
purchasers to influence improvements in health care quality. When reviewing these 
options, PEHP executives and policymakers, should consider the following questions: 
 
• What options are available to state PEHPs to drive improvements in health 
care quality? 
• What are the key barriers or constraints facing state PEHPs in their efforts to 
improve care quality? 
• To what extent can the quality promotion activities of state PEHPs affect not only 
covered state employees, retirees, and their dependents, but also health system 
performance more broadly? 
 
PURCHASER APPROACHES TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE QUALITY 
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) defines health care quality as “the degree to which 
health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health 
outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge.”16 There are as many 
determinants of care quality as there are approaches for improving it. This paper broadly 
outlines categories of options that health care purchasers, including state PEHPs, can 
pursue to stimulate improvement. 
 
This report can be used by PEHPs and other purchasers considering how to 
develop or refine quality improvement initiatives. Each general approach is associated 
with distinctive challenges and hurdles for implementation and effectiveness. Feasibility, 
desirability, or effectiveness of different strategies can vary, based on a host of issues. These 
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 include the level of internal or external capacity to implement new programs, state market 
characteristics (including organization and distribution of health plans and provider groups), 
the ability to coordinate with other employer groups or coalitions, availability and level 
of funding, political receptivity, and the existence of health information technology. 
 
Many quality improvement approaches build on one another. For instance, 
collecting and analyzing data then allows for those data to be used to develop measures, 
evaluate performance, and create programs for continuous quality improvement. The goal 
of this report is to demonstrate how PEHPs and other purchasers can use combinations of 
these and other strategies as part of their overall quality improvement agendas. 
 
Data Collection, Measurement, and Performance Reporting 
Collecting and Analyzing Performance-Related Data 
Quality improvement efforts fundamentally rely on obtaining quality-related data from 
health plans, providers, and consumers. These include data on patient demographics and 
utilization, health care processes and outcomes, and patient satisfaction and experience. 
Collecting and analyzing information about care quality can help purchasers better 
understand practice pattern variation, health care disparities, regional gaps in quality, and 
access to providers and appropriate services. 
 
Data collection and quality measurement efforts can be used to benchmark and 
compare health plans and providers and help purchasers assess consumers’ perceptions 
and experiences with the care they receive. These efforts can also allow purchasers to 
work closely with delivery system stakeholders to develop strategies to improve 
performance. Even if consumers do not have access to such information, providers and 
health plans may be motivated to examine or change practices when presented with 
information that benchmarks performance against their peers. Several studies have 
documented the benefits of providing hospitals with performance information, 
particularly comparative data.17
 
The most commonly used quality-related measures for health plans are contained 
in the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) maintained by the 
National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA).18 HEDIS was created in the late 
1980s to establish a set of measures of health plan performance that would be useful to 
employer purchasers.19 HEDIS measures include clinical performance indicators such as 
rates of cervical cancer screening, mammography screening, immunization, and 
secondary preventive measures for such conditions like asthma, diabetes, and coronary 
artery disease. HEDIS measures allow purchasers to make valid comparisons and to hold 
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 health plans and care providers of care accountable for their performance.20 Other 
relevant sources of quality data include the National Quality Forum, the Hospital Quality 
Alliance, Ambulatory Care Quality Alliance, the Leapfrog Group, and the federal Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). 
 
Patient satisfaction or experience with the health care system represents another 
important dimension of health care quality that purchasers can monitor and evaluate. The 
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) survey, developed 
by AHRQ, has become the most widely used instrument for assessing consumers’ 
experiences and opinions regarding the quality of care they receive. CAHPS has 
gradually expanded beyond its original focus on health plans to address a range of health 
care services and delivery systems.21 Other consumer-oriented surveys, including the 
Consumer Health Plan Value Survey and the NCQA enrollee satisfaction survey, can also 
be used to supplement HEDIS consumer satisfaction and process and outcome measures. 
Moreover, third party vendors, such as Press Ganey and The Jackson Group, produce 
institution-specific patient and consumer experience surveys for most hospitals in the 
United States. 
 
The Massachusetts Group Insurance 
Commission (GIC) purchases health benefits on 
behalf of approximately 267,000 public 
employees and their dependents. In 2004, GIC 
began requiring that participating health plans 
submit medical, mental health, and pharmacy 
claims data to create a consolidated database 
on provider performance. GIC is using this vast 
database of claims information for analytical 
purposes and to develop new purchasing 
strategies designed to improve efficiency and 
care quality. 
Some purchasers provide incentives 
for health plans and provider groups to 
report quality-related data. For example, 
Medicare has established a program to 
collect Hospital Quality Alliance (HQA) 
data from hospitals to measure management 
of common medical conditions. HQA is 
the largest program for systematically 
rating the quality of hospital care in the 
United States.22 Medicare withholds a 
small percentage of its fee schedule update for any hospital that chooses not to participate in 
the collection and reporting of key measures of hospitals’ management of three common 
medical conditions: acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia. 
As of December 2006, more than 4,300 hospitals reported data in to the program.23
 
Other purchasers are developing new contracting provisions that encourage 
or require participating health plans or provider groups to make performance-related 
data available. 
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 Purchasers can use “pay-for-reporting” initiatives, contractual requirements for 
performance reporting, and other mechanisms to facilitate the participation of health care 
stakeholders in quality-related surveys and measurements. 
 
Measuring and Promoting Adherence to Clinical Guidelines and Best Practices 
In addition to collecting and analyzing quality-related data, purchasers can play an 
important role in promoting the use of evidence-based guidelines—clinical guidelines 
used to assist in decision-making about appropriate health care for specific clinical 
conditions. Purchasers can promote the adoption of guidelines, for example, from the 
National Guideline Clearinghouse, a public resource for evidence-based clinical practice 
guidelines, sponsored by AHRQ. Evidence-based guidelines must be evaluated 
continuously as they are translated into practice. 
 
Large health care purchasers do not 
typically create guidelines or establish best 
practices directly, but can use guidelines 
to monitor trends and contribute to the 
process of assessing the underlying issues 
regarding adherence and non-adherence. 
While provider non-adherence to guidelines 
may indicate gaps in quality, non-adherence 
may also be due to other issues, such as 
low rates of physician acceptance or 
knowledge about clinical guidelines. Non-
adherence may also be associated with 
gaps in consumer compliance, lack of 
insurance coverage for particular services, or the lack of resources available to achieve 
standard recommendations at the community, hospital, or practice level.24
The Arkansas Foundation for Medical Care, with 
funding and technical support from the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation and Center for 
Health Care Strategies, launched a new multi-
payer Regional Quality Improvement Initiative in 
2006. The initiative—which includes Medicaid, 
the Arkansas State Employees Insurance Plan, 
and other large payers—has convened groups 
of health care leaders throughout the state to 
better understand available data and to use 
those data in a coordinated fashion to assess 
gaps in quality. The initiative is also collecting 
claims and other data from health care 
purchasers to develop a uniform set of quality 
measures that can facilitate ongoing 
performance monitoring and the development of 
new programs to improve care quality. 
 
Health care purchasers, particularly those confined to particular geographic 
locations (such as state PEHPs) can monitor trends and organize stakeholders to address 
gaps in adherence to standards. Specifically, PEHPs can convene groups of practicing 
physicians, health plan medical directors, hospital executives, and medical society 
leadership to assess whether there is consensus within the provider community regarding 
best practices, the availability of provider resources to treat patients according to 
guidelines, and areas where standards or guidelines might need refinement through 
additional research. By playing a leadership role in addressing these issues, purchasers 
can identify barriers to high quality care, provide resources to overcome them, and 
catalyze the development of new programs. 
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 Public Reporting of Quality-Related Information 
Increasingly, purchasers are reporting information about provider and health plan 
performance and consumer satisfaction to the public. In the past several years, for 
example, purchasers have embraced efforts to facilitate the public reporting of hospital 
and physician quality information, ranging from small localized programs to broader 
initiatives, such as a major patient safety program sponsored by the Leapfrog Group.25
 
Public reporting can play an 
important role in improving care quality 
and the choices available to patients, 
referring physicians, and health care 
purchasers. The validity of public reporting 
efforts can depend on the specific clinical 
contexts examined (e.g., whether measures 
account for co-morbidities) and the 
underlying accuracy and appropriateness 
of information presented to consumers 
(e.g., whether provider-specific reports are adequately risk adjusted).26 In general, studies 
show that although public reporting can motivate changes in provider behavior, consumers 
do not always use such information, when available, to inform their choices of health 
plans, physicians, or hospitals.27 Additionally, critics argue that public performance 
reports can have unintended consequences. For example, providers may avoid high-risk 
patients. Purchasers should consider these issues and learn from the experiences of other 
programs when designing new performance reporting initiatives. 
The Wisconsin Department of Employee Trust 
Funds (ETF), which purchases health care 
benefits for Wisconsin state employees, views 
public reporting of quality-related information as 
a key component of its broader value-based 
purchasing efforts. ETF provides consumers 
with comparative performance information on the 
health plans offered to members. Beginning in 
1996, ETF launched its public reporting initiative 
by releasing CAHPS data results. Since then, 
ETF has included other recognized performance 
measures, including HEDIS measures. 
 
It is clear that health care 
purchasers, and, to some extent consumers, 
will continue seeking and reporting 
information about provider performance 
and consumers’ experiences with health 
care. AHRQ has recently compiled a new 
online directory containing examples of 
different approaches for provider report 
cards that purchasers are using to inform 
the public about provider quality.28 Such 
information can help foster the 
coordinated development of accurate and timely public reporting mechanisms and 
facilitate consumer engagement. 
The Minnesota State Employee Group 
Insurance Program provides consumers and 
providers with a Web-based resource to 
compare quality-related performance across 
health care clinics. Current measures, which are 
provided by Minnesota Community 
Measurement, report on the experiences of 
patients in 54 clinic groups, representing about 
three-quarters of the state’s population. 
Available information includes how clinics 
perform in 10 specific areas of treatment, from 
immunizations to chronic care, and for 
conditions including heart disease and diabetes.
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 Performance-Based Provider Incentives 
Payment Incentives 
Using provider payment mechanisms like performance-based reimbursement can generate 
strong incentives that can influence the quality and efficiency of care.29 The IOM has 
recommended that purchasers “align financial incentives with care processes based on best 
practices and the achievement of better patient outcomes.”30 Health plans and purchasers 
have increasingly adopted new payment and bonus incentives that make payments partly 
contingent upon providers completing certain tasks associated with care quality. 
 
Pay-for-performance, an increasingly common performance-based approach used 
by commercial health plans31 and public payers,32 provides incremental revenue 
enhancements to providers achieving certain quality thresholds, typically evidence-based 
guidelines. Research focusing on early pay-for-performance designs has produced mixed 
results to date.33 A major three-year evaluation that tested a variety of models found that 
financial incentives targeted at physicians do motivate measurable improvements in care 
quality.34 Other studies suggest that several design features of early programs may require 
modification as programs evolve.35 For example, most early pay-for-performance 
programs reward providers based on absolute levels of quality (as measured through 
adherence to certain protocols or meeting benchmarks) rather than continuous quality 
improvement. Thus, providers in need of significant structural investments or other major 
changes to attain absolute targets of care may not be motivated to improve. Additionally, to 
the extent that poor performance is a function of provider resource constraints inhibiting 
structural investments, rather than provider motivation or levels of effort, pay-for-
performance initiatives may shift funds toward resource-rich providers and away from 
those who could use increased resources to facilitate the delivery of higher care quality. 
 
State PEHPs and other purchasers 
interested in experimenting with pay-for-
performance can learn from the evaluations 
and experiences of many existing 
programs.36 Bridges to Excellence (BTE), 
for example, is the largest employer-
sponsored effort to reward and recognize 
physicians for meeting quality benchmarks. 
BTE uses NCQA programs that reward 
physicians who consistently produce high-quality outcomes in clinical settings. BTE has 
resources available for purchasers interested in developing payment-based provider 
incentives to stimulate quality improvements. Additionally, AHRQ has developed a 
The state of Pennsylvania recently announced 
plans for state-funded programs, including the 
Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund 
(PEBTF), to stop paying for “never events.” 
The PETBF, which administers benefits for 
144,000 state employees, retirees, and 
dependents, anticipates that this action will 
stimulate performance improvements that can 
reduce the number of unnecessary infections 
and other complications. 
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 decision guide resource for public and private purchasers who are developing pay-for-
performance initiatives.37
 
Another strategy is to withhold 
payments for services resulting from 
preventable complications or errors. Some 
large purchasers and health plans are 
experimenting with new programs to 
refuse payments for conditions and events 
deemed directly related to poor care. These 
so-called “never events” may include 
medical instruments being left in patients 
during surgery, blood incompatibility, or 
certain hospital-related infections.38
 
Private health plans have 
experimented with such approaches for 
several years. HealthPartners, a 
Minnesota-based nonprofit HMO, began 
refusing payment for 27 “never events” in 
early 2005. This policy is limited to 
particularly rare events (e.g., surgery 
performed on the wrong body part or on 
the wrong patient) based on standards 
established by the National Quality 
Forum.39 In August 2007, CMS 
established a new rule, stating that 
Medicare will no longer pay the extra 
costs of treating preventable errors, injuries, and infections that occur in hospitals.40,41
The California Public Employees Retirement 
System (CalPERS) provides health care benefits 
on behalf of 1.3 million public employees and 
dependents in California. In partnership with 
Blue Shield of California, CalPERS launched a 
“Narrow Network Initiative” (NNI) in 2003 that 
resulted in the removal of several low-
performing providers from the Blue Shield HMO 
provider network. The NNI assessed network 
providers’ relative cost and quality and required 
members to either stop using excluded hospitals 
and affiliated physicians or to enroll in different 
plan options that retain these providers in 
network but include higher out-of-pocket costs. 
Due to concerns about limiting patients’ access 
to health care providers, however, some 
providers initially removed were later permitted 
to rejoin the network. 
The National Business Group on Health, a 
national nonprofit that represents large employers, 
has developed specific recommendations for 
employers and other purchasers to include in 
contracts with health plans to improve patient 
safety in hospitals. These recommendations 
include posting standardized performance 
information on the hospital’s Web site, 
maintaining a dedicated patient safety team with 
active CEO and board member involvement, 
and encouraging the use of contract provisions 
to prohibit payment for certain medical services 
that were delivered inappropriately or that led to 
preventable complications. 
 
Quality-Related Contract Requirements 
While payment reform efforts have captured headlines in recent years, purchasers do not 
have to adopt pay-for-performance models to create incentives for health plans and 
provider groups to improve care quality. Purchasers can establish contract requirements 
to ensure the reporting of performance data, which can be used in negotiations with 
health plans and providers regarding performance improvement requirements and 
contracting decisions. Excluding plans or groups from networks can also encourage 
improved performance by provider groups. 
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 Leveraging contracting influence 
with health plans and provider groups can 
be difficult and controversial for many 
reasons, including concerns about the 
impact on access to health care if certain 
providers or health plans are excluded or 
voluntarily opt out of participation. 
However, explicit contract requirements 
regarding care quality initiatives and the 
threat or execution of network exclusion 
can be powerful strategies that purchasers 
can use to motivate investments in 
performance improvement. 
The Oregon Public Employees Benefit Board 
(PEBB), the state’s largest employer-based 
health plan—representing more than 120,000 
public employees and their families, recently 
launched a Vision 2007 initiative, which seeks to 
stimulate quality improvement in Oregon. A 
hallmark of the initiative is to include detailed 
quality goals and requirements in contract 
language with health plan and to evaluate health 
plan proposals based on quality improvement 
initiatives or improvements. PEBB’s request for 
proposals for health plans included detailed 
information regarding the use of evidence-based 
care, promotion of transparency, inclusion of 
consumer self-management programs, and 
detailed guidelines for health plans engaging 
directly with provider groups at local levels to 
develop joint quality promotion pilot or 
demonstration programs.  
Patient-Centered Interventions 
Many of the purchaser-led quality improvement strategies discussed in this report have 
focused on influencing the behaviors and practices of providers and insurers. However, 
purchasers and health plans can also seek to improve care quality by influencing 
consumers’ or patients’ behaviors. Consumer behavior can be targeted a variety of ways, 
including benefit design and cost-sharing arrangements, wellness and disease 
management programs, and patient education and health literacy improvement programs. 
 
Benefit Design and Cost-Sharing 
Large purchasers can influence the health services available to covered populations and the 
cost-sharing obligations required to access those services. Ensuring that benefit packages 
include services that are consistent with high quality care, such as necessary preventive 
services, can influence the degree to which consumers use particular services. For example, 
the expansion of Medicare reimbursement to cover colon cancer screening has been 
credited with increasing the use of 
colonoscopies among Medicare 
beneficiaries, as well as increasing the 
likelihood of early diagnosis of colon 
cancer.42 This suggests the importance of 
benefit design as a mechanism to facilitate 
early disease diagnosis, which has 
important implications for care quality. 
Catamount Health, Vermont’s new health 
coverage program for uninsured residents, covers 
preventive services and chronic care management 
services without requiring consumer cost-sharing 
to encourage consumer adherence to evidence-
based care. The state plans to expand such efforts 
across state programs, including state employees, 
as part of the Vermont Blueprint for Health. 
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 In addition, purchasers can use other incentives to encourage consumers to make 
health care choices that are consistent with high quality. One strategy, for example, involves 
reducing or eliminating consumer cost-sharing requirements, and providing educational 
support programs, to encourage behaviors that promote positive health outcomes.43
 
This could entail reducing copayments or premiums for consumers who 
voluntarily complete health risk assessments or participate in health literacy, smoking 
cessation, or health coaching programs. Or it could involve lowering cost-sharing for 
specific “clinically valuable” services (e.g., beta-blockers) that are recognized to provide 
benefits for patients with certain conditions (e.g., congestive heart failure or myocardial 
infarction). Purchasers and health plans can also establish different cost-sharing 
provisions based on patients’ characteristics. For example, programs can identify patients 
with specific diseases, such as diabetes or coronary heart disease, and reduce cost-sharing 
for high-value services to increase patients’ adherence to treatment.44
 
Incentives must be carefully 
designed and introduced to ensure that 
they appropriately guide consumers to 
high-quality evidence-based care. Such 
approaches can be technically difficult to 
administer and can generate political 
challenges if some groups are perceived 
to be favored over others. Moreover, 
comprehensive assessments of the effects 
of these programs are not yet widely available. Nonetheless, this approach highlights the 
important role purchasers can play in encouraging and equipping consumers to make 
choices consistent with high quality care. 
The University of Michigan established an 
initiative beginning in July 2006 called the 
“M-Healthy: Focus on Diabetes Program,” which 
targets 2,200 employees and dependents 
diagnosed with diabetes mellitus. The program 
provides diabetics with point-of-service 
copayment reductions for drugs that help 
prevent or reduce the long-term consequences 
of disease (e.g., those affecting blood sugar 
levels, blood pressure, cholesterol, depression).
 
 
High performance networks (HPN) 
represent a related patient-centered 
strategy to promote care quality. HPNs 
use cost-sharing to encourage consumers to 
select hospitals and physicians providing 
high quality, efficient care. Under HPNs, 
high-performing providers are placed in a 
“preferred” tier while other in-network 
providers are placed in non-preferred 
tiers. As an incentive for selecting high-
In 2002, the Minnesota State Employee Group 
Insurance Program introduced a new self-
insured purchasing model, called Advantage, 
that rank primary care clinic systems. The 
Advantage program ranks more than 50 “care 
systems” or “clinic groups” based on their risk-
adjusted costs. Care systems are then assigned 
to one of four cost tiers as determined by claims 
experience, risk adjustment, actuarial models, 
and collective bargaining. Members select their 
care system and pay higher copayments, 
deductibles, and coinsurance when using higher 
cost clinic groups. 
12 
 performing providers, consumers who select these preferred providers have lower cost-
sharing obligations. Under HPNs, providers who deliver efficient high quality care have 
a clear advantage in achieving and maintaining preferred tier placement. Thus, providers 
may be willing to invest in improvements in quality or efficiency to ensure preferred 
tier placement. 
 
HPN efforts may take years to 
take full effect, and can be technically 
challenging, necessitating major 
investments to develop the data capacity 
necessary to collect and analyze clinical 
information at the group or individual 
provider level.45 Due to the way providers 
are ranked based on the efficiency and 
quality of care they deliver, the 
introduction of HPNs can also be quite controversial as provider groups understandably 
seek information about the underlying validity of measures. While the general HPN 
approach is generating interest among purchasers and health plans, further research is 
needed to address the robustness and adequacy of underlying tier designations and the 
likelihood that these designations can drive improvements in quality. 
Several PEHPs are experimenting with high 
deductible health plans as optional benefit 
choices, some of which are coupled with savings 
or reimbursement accounts. These include the 
Arkansas State Employee Health Plan (imple-
mented in 2006), Indiana State Employee Health 
Plan (2007), Nebraska State Employee Program 
(2007), South Carolina Employee Insurance 
Program (2004), Utah Public Employees Health 
Program (2006), and Wyoming Employees 
Group Insurance Program (2006). 
 
Finally, a small but growing 
movement around consumer-directed 
health plans (CDHP) seeks to combine 
higher patient cost-sharing, consumer 
information tools, and increased financial 
incentives for consumers to control 
spending.46 Proponents of CDHPs argue 
that by making consumers aware of the 
financial consequences of their medical 
decisions, they will increasingly exert 
pressure on physicians and hospitals to 
improve quality of care.47 However, numerous studies demonstrate that higher consumer 
cost-sharing—a key element of CDHP—results in decreased utilization of appropriate 
care, including necessary preventive services.48 Other analysts point out that current 
CDHP designs do not include robust consumer decision support tools that include 
comparative and valid measures of quality.49 Nonetheless, to the extent that CDHP 
designs evolve and robust decision support tools emerge, CDHPs may ultimately help to 
engage consumers in managing their care. 
The North Carolina State Health Plan, which 
provides health care benefits for more than 
615,000 public sector employees, retirees, and 
dependents, began offering a new healthy living 
initiative for its members in 2005 called 
HealthSmart. Among other care management 
activities, HealthSmart includes an Internet-
based Personal Health Portal where members 
can take a Health Risk Assessment and receive 
a customized Personal Action Plan, health-
coaching services, worksite wellness programs, 
and information about specific diseases and diet 
and exercise. 
13 
 Coordinated Care Interventions 
Chronically ill populations, particularly 
those suffering from multiple diseases and 
conditions or receiving services from 
various health care providers, require 
appropriate, ongoing management and 
intervention to ensure adherence to high 
quality care and improved health 
outcomes. Accordingly, many purchasers 
have developed varying forms of 
coordinated health care interventions and 
communications for consumers. 
Interventions focus on patients already 
suffering from chronic diseases or 
conditions, as well as on relatively healthy 
populations to prevent or reduce the 
burden of chronic or disabling conditions. 
Vermont’s Blueprint for Health, a new statewide 
chronic care initiative that will be fully 
implemented by 2009, provides new resources 
to improve the health of individuals with and at-
risk for specific chronic conditions, including 
arthritis, asthma, heart disease, and diabetes. 
The new comprehensive program includes 
developing new chronic care management 
programs in Medicaid (Vermont Health Access), 
the Vermont children’s health insurance program 
(Dr. Dynasaur), the state’s self-insured health 
plan for state employees, a new public 
insurance program for low-income uninsured 
individuals (Catamount Health), and other public 
and private payers. Overall, Vermont’s “Blueprint 
for Health” is part of a larger state reform effort 
that focuses on expanding access to coverage 
and on improving the health system’s ability to 
prevent illness and complications, rather than 
reacting to poor health outcomes. 
 
Coordinated care interventions combine provider and patient approaches to 
promote patient-focused, coordinated care to reduce the complications or consequences 
of chronic disease. In provider-focused approaches, physicians receive information and 
incentives to facilitate the delivery of high quality and appropriate care. Similarly, patient 
focused approaches aim to equip patients with information and incentives to promote 
effective self-management and adherence to physicians’ treatment plans. 
 
Several studies demonstrate the positive impacts of coordinated care interventions 
for chronic disease. For example, one review found that disease management programs 
can improve patient satisfaction, patient adherence, and disease control.50 However, other 
studies have been unable to detect any significant improvement in short-term clinical 
outcomes.51,52 As state PEHPs consider introducing new disease management initiatives, 
they should carefully examine lessons learned from programs in operation to identify best 
practice models that have the strongest likelihood of influencing cost and quality. 
 
Leadership in Public–Private Purchaser Coalitions 
The fragmentation and complexity of the health care system can limit the ability of any 
single stakeholder—even the largest and most assertive purchaser—to produce 
meaningful and lasting effects on care quality. Multiple purchasers working 
independently can produce a confusing web of strategies, reporting requirements, and 
14 
 other incentives for providers, health plans, and patients. Physicians may not be able to 
manage a large number of disparate quality improvement initiatives from multiple 
purchasers and health plans. Instead, they may choose to participate in initiatives from a 
dominant purchaser or purchaser coalition.53
 
Thus, purchasers and other health 
system stakeholders may be more 
effective by working with coalitions that 
collectively focus on improving health 
care quality. Together, purchasers can 
work to develop effective strategies to 
coordinate performance measurement and 
reporting efforts, payment and consumer 
incentives, and other mechanisms to 
support improvements in care quality. 
Such collaborations can work toward 
developing infrastructure development 
goals associated with quality 
improvement, such adopting health 
information technology. 
The Kansas Health Policy Authority is a 
governmental entity established in 2005 that is 
responsible for coordinating a statewide health 
policy agenda to promote effective purchasing 
and administration. The Authority, which 
includes Medicaid, Kansas State Employees 
Health Benefits Plan (SEHBP), and other public 
programs, seeks to test and coordinate new 
coverage and quality initiatives, including health 
promotion and wellness strategies, with the 
ultimate goal of expanding these strategies to 
private payers statewide. In addition to 
developing joint care management and other 
strategies across programs, the state seeks to 
merge claims and other information across 
Medicaid, SCHIP, and the SEHBP. This 
ambitious effort will drive administrative 
purchasing efficiencies and facilitate system 
wide performance evaluation, monitoring, and 
continuous quality improvement. 
 
Public–private purchaser coalitions or collaborative initiatives that focus on health 
care quality include prominent involvement by PEHPs, as follows: 
 
 The Puget Sound Health Alliance in Washington seeks to improve the quality of 
care using several coordinated strategies, including the public dissemination of 
provider performance reports.54 The Washington State Health Care Authority, 
which administers benefits for about 350,000 state employees and higher-
education staff, is a partner in the Alliance and is supporting the effort to release 
provider performance information across a five-county region. Alliance 
stakeholders are currently devising coordinated strategies to identify providers in 
public performance reports (i.e., at the group or individual levels), determine what 
measures should be included, and decide how best to release the information to 
help consumers and purchasers make valid comparisons.55 
 The Minnesota’s Smart Buy Alliance is a group of public and private health care 
purchasers who share knowledge about pay-for-performance, public reporting, 
and designated centers of excellence to promote and reward higher value.56 Its 
members include the state agencies that oversee Medicaid and public employee 
15 
 health benefits. Other members include business and, until recently, labor unions.57 
Recent experiences illustrate the challenge of building and maintaining coalitions 
of disparate purchasers. In July 2007, the Labor Management Coalition of the 
Upper Midwest—a major component of the Alliance, representing over 300,000 
people—exited the Alliance due to disagreements regarding the structure and pace 
of activities. 
 
These and other prominent purchaser coalitions and organizations suggest the important 
role that states can play as major purchasers contributing to quality promotion activities, 
and also highlight the challenges and rewards facing state PEHPs. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Health care leaders, policymakers, and researchers have long recognized that the overall 
quality of care in the U.S. health care system has room for improvement. Large health 
care purchasers and other health system stakeholders have experimented with a wide 
range of options to stimulate improvements in care quality. These strategies vary by the 
kinds of indicators used, the types of incentives employed, and the populations targeted. 
In turn, they create different technical, organizational, financial challenges. While the 
different options included in this report vary in important ways, they share the 
overarching goal of promoting quality improvement and ultimately improving the health 
status of the population. 
 
As large health care purchasers operating at the state level, state PEHPs are in a 
unique position to contribute to quality promotion activities. Rather than viewing specific 
options or programs in isolation, state PEHPs and other purchasers should seek to 
combine and align quality improvement strategies where possible. This can include 
developing quality “portfolios,” which may include collecting and analyzing data to 
evaluate performance, benchmarking provider performance against peers, as well as 
public reporting efforts, performance-based payment mechanisms, consumer incentives, 
coordinated care interventions, and collaborations with other purchasers. 
 
Given the limited research available regarding some of the options outlined, 
organizations looking to develop and implement new initiatives should look to the 
quality-improvement efforts—both the challenges and success stories—of state PEHPs 
and other large health care purchasers. 
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 APPENDIX B. ORGANIZATIONS OR PROGRAMS MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT 
 
Public Employee Health Plans 
Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration, Employee Benefits Division: 
www.arkansas.gov/dfa/employee_benefits/ebd_index.html
California Public Employees’ Retirement System: www.calpers.ca.gov
Indiana State Personnel Department, State Employee Benefits: 
www.in.gov/jobs/benefits/benefitsummaries.htm
Kansas State Employee Health Benefits Plan: www.khpa.ks.gov/OpenEnrollment07/benefits07.htm
Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission: www.mass.gov/gic
Nebraska Administrative Services, Employee Benefits: www.das.state.ne.us/personnel/benefits/
North Carolina State Health Plan: http://statehealthplan.state.nc.us
Oregon Public Employees’ Benefit Board: http://pebb.das.state.or.us
Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund: www.pebtf.org/
South Carolina Employee Insurance Program: www.eip.sc.gov
Utah Public Employees Health Program: www.pehp.org/
Vermont Department of Human Resources: http://www.vermontpersonnel.org/employee/index.php
Washington State Health Care Authority: www.hca.wa.gov
Wisconsin Department of Employee Trust Funds: http://etf.wi.gov
Wyoming Employees’ Group Insurance: http://personnel.state.wy.us/EGI/Index.htm
 
Other Organizations or Programs 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality: www.ahrq.gov
Ambulatory Care Quality Alliance: www.aqaalliance.org
Arkansas Foundation for Medical Care: www.afmc.org
Bridges to Excellence: www.bridgestoexcellence.org
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services: www.cms.hhs.gov
HealthPartners: www.healthpartners.com/
Hospital Quality Alliance: www.aha.org/aha_app/issues/HQA/index.jsp
Kansas Health Policy Authority: www.khpa.ks.gov/subject/benlink.htm
The Leapfrog Group: www.leapfroggroup.org
Maine Quality Forum: www.mainequalityforum.gov
Massachusetts Health Care Quality and Cost Council: 
www.mass.gov/?pageID=hqcchomepage&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Ihqcc
Minnesota Smart Buy Alliance/Buyer’s Health Care Action Group: http://bhcag2.avenet.net
National Committee for Quality Assurance: www.ncqa.org
National Guidelines Clearinghouse: www.guideline.gov
National Quality Forum: www.qualityforum.org
Puget Sound Health Alliance: www.pugetsoundhealthalliance.org
Vermont “Blueprint for Health”: http://healthvermont.gov/blueprint.aspx
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